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INTRODUCTION

Jay Katz introduces his remarkable and insightful book, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient,' by recounting a portion of
Solzhenitsyn's Cancer Ward.2 He describes an encounter between a
patient, Oleg Kostoglotov, and his doctor, Dr. Ludmilla Afanasyevna.
The doctor wanted to use experimental hormone treatment, but the
patient refused. Katz argues that what made conversation impossible
between them was the patient's undisclosed intention of leaving the
hospital to treat himself with "a secret medicine, a mandrake root
from Issyk Kul." He could not trust the doctor with this information
because the doctor would make the decision for the patient in any
event, because the doctor believed, "doctors are entitled to that right
'3
...without that right there'd be no such thing as medicine."
Katz objects to this notion, pointing out that "if doctors are 'entitled to that right,' then patients must continue to trust them silently."
But he also chastises "proponents of informed consent and patient
self-determination" (among whom I number myself), 4 who "have insufficiently appreciated that trusting oneself and others to become
aware of the certainties and uncertainties that surround the practice of
medicine, and to integrate them with one's hopes, fears, and realistic
expectations, are inordinately difficult tasks" (p. xv). His purpose in
this book, he tells us, is not to explore informed consent in great depth,
t
*
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3. Id., quoted in KATZ, supra note 1, at xv.
4.
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but to "identify as many issues as possible and to pursue them for
some distance" (p. xx).
My own purpose is to explore one of the many "leads" Professor
Katz offers in a bit more depth: the application of informed consent
to artificial heart experimentation. Using this extreme example, I will
argue that Katz is certainly correct in proposing more in-depth, informed and trusting conversation between doctor-researcher and patient-subject. But much more than conversation is required to
promote and protect the rights and welfare of individual subjects.
Solzhenitsyn's fictional patient, Oleg, knows about his folk remedy,
and so satisfies the informational requirements of informed consent:
When I get back to Ush-Terek I'll use the issyk-kul root to keep the
tumor from producing metastases. There is something noble in curing with strong poison. Poison doesn't pretend to be innocent
medicine. It says plainly: I am poison. Watch out! Or else. And we
know what risk we're taking.5
Suppose that it was not Oleg, but Dr. Afanasyevna who was proposing to use the issyk-kul root; and suppose doctor and patient had
discussed this "experimental treatment" at length, and that Oleg understood the risks perfectly. Under these conditions would we or
should we conclude that it is perfectly acceptable for the issyk-kul root
to be administered to Oleg? This commentary argues that while such
informed consent is a necessary precondition to lawful human experimentation, it is not a sufficient one. Prior to the conversation and offer
of an experimental intervention, an independent judgment must be
made that the proposed therapy, be it surgery, radiation, or an issykkul root, is a reasonable medical experiment from both a scientific and
public policy perspective. This is necessary to protect the patient's
welfare; to prevent patients from being demeaned and dehumanized by
accepting offers they are in no position to refuse.
Medical ethicist John Fletcher of the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), for example, correctly argues that "the major ethical
question in research is whether the experiment ought to be done at
all." '6 The law, as embodied in the Nuremberg Code 7 and current
5. A. I. SOLZHENITSYN, supra note 2, at 347 (emphasis added).
6. Fletcher, The Evolution of the Ethics of Informed Consent, in RESEARCH ETHICS
211 (K. Berg & K. Teanoy eds. 1983).
7. Reprinted in J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 305-06 (1972)
[hereinafter EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS]. The Declaration of Helsinki is
similar, but has been described as "less legalistic." E.g., Refshauge, The Placefor International Standards in Conducting Research on Humans, 55 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG.

135 (1977).
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NIH regulations, 8 is consistent with this view. The Nuremberg Code,
formulated on the basis of international criminal law by American
judges sitting in the Nazi War Crimes Trials, sets forth ten prerequisites for legal human experimentation. The first principle deals with
the informed consent of the research subject, or what may be termed
the subject's rights. The other nine principles have primarily to do
with protecting the subject's welfare: they set forth actions that must
be taken prior to seeking subject enrollment in the experiment. These
actions include a determination that the experiment is designed properly to yield fruitful results "unprocurable by other methods"; that its
"anticipated results" will justify performance of the experiment; that
all "unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury" is avoided;
that there is no "a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur"; that the project has "humanitarian importance" that
outweighs the degree of risk; that "adequate preparation" is taken to
"protect the experimental subject against even the remote possibilities
of injury, disability, or death"; that only "scientifically qualified" persons conduct the experiment; that the subject can terminate participation at any time; and that the experimenter is prepared to terminate
the experiment if "continuation is likely to result in injury, disability,
or death to the experimental subject." 9
NIH and FDA have codified these general preconditions in their
regulations, and local committees, called Institutional Review Boards
(IRBs) are mandated to review research protocols prior to subject recruitment to see to it that these preconditions have been observed.' 0
Our initial experience with heart transplantation, and our current experience with the artificial heart, illustrate how informed consent can
be used improperly as an excuse to justify massive assaults on the welfare of human subjects, even though the quality of the consent is
highly questionable, and the quality of the experiment itself does not
meet the welfare requirements of the Nuremberg Code.
I.

INFORMED CONSENT TO HEART TRANSPLANTATION

Professor Katz's casebook Experimentation with Human Be-

ings,IIhas had a profound impact on my own thinking, and I used it
as a text in more than a dozen courses during the 1970s. It is the finest
8. Protection of Human Subjects, FDA, HHS, 46 Fed. Reg. 8942 (1981). See also
Proposed Model Federal Policy for Protection of Human Subjects, Office of Science and
Technology, 51 Fed. Reg. 20,204 (1986).

9. See EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 7, at 305-06.
10. R. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH (2d ed. 1986).
11. EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 7.
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collection of materials ever assembled on this subject. One of my favorite readings from the casebook is the excerpt from Philip Blaiberg's
Looking at My Heart,12 portions of which Jay Katz also reproduces in
his powerful chapter VI, "Respecting Autonomy: The Obligation for
Conversation" in The Silent World of Doctor and Patient (pp. 130-39).
In this chapter, Katz persuasively demonstrates that Philip Blaiberg,
the recipient of the world's second human-to-human heart transplant,
regressed when in the presence of Dr. Christiaan Barnard. He saw
him as an "omnipotent parent and hero ... Barnard became General
Smuts, under whom Blaiberg had served and admired greatly... Barnard also became Christ, the powerful protector" (p. 132). But in
identifying Barnard as Christ, Blaiberg may have "confused his own
identity with that of the surgeon" (pp. 132-33). He actually said he
wanted to go through with the operation "not only for my sake but for
you [Barnard] and your team who put so much into your effort to save
Louis Washkansky" (p. 132). Barnard himself seemed unaware of this
confusion on the part of his patient, and of his own conflict of interest
between wanting to perform the world's second human heart transplant for himself, and attempting to convince Blaiberg that the operation was in Blaiberg's best interests. Indeed, Barnard even began
talking about the operation as fulfilling not his own goals, but
"Washkansky's dream." This, as Professor Katz notes, "is startling
and suggests that he was as confused about his identity as Blaiberg was
about his own" (pp. 139-40).
Louis Washkansky, the recipient of the world's first human-tohuman heart transplant, it turned out, also was not particularly interested in discussing the details of heart transplantation. Barnard did
not press the issue, deciding "no words were needed." But were they?
Katz argues that more words (conversation) may not have changed
the ultimate decision, but could have improved "the nature and quality of Barnard's and Washkansky's thinking about available choices"
(p. 137).
Both, at best, had reflected on the forthcoming operation in isolation, and neither had any idea what had transpired in the other's
mind. At the least, respect for Washkansky's psychological autonomy required Barnard to challenge his patient's silent acquiescence .... If Washkansky wanted a new heart, he also had to have
13
the heart to learn more about the operation (pp. 140-41).

Katz continues by noting that since the first heart transplant op12. Id. at 640-42.
13. (emphasis added).
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erations were "extraordinary" procedures, candidates should be required to learn about them, and not permitted to give disclosure and
consent. "Barnard should have insisted they talk for a while" (p. 141).
Katz concludes his discussion of this case by noting the common
clinical controversy over whether to respect the patient's "rights" or
"needs" (p. 141). I shall restate this "conflict" by attempting to construct a system that protects both the "rights" and "welfare" of subjects of "extraordinary" human experimentation.
Katz presents a psychoanalytic explanation of the dynamics of
the doctor-patient relationship in the dramatic human experimentation context, and suggests conversation to help elucidate issues of
transference and countertransference. He argues powerfully that
"[m]agical and hopeful expectations exist side by side with expectations of cruel disappointment" (p. 144). And later, he notes that when
medical knowledge and skill prove impotent against the claims of nature, "all kinds of senseless interventions are tried in an unconscious
effort to cure the incurable magically through a 'wonder drug,' a novel
surgical procedure, or a penetrating psychological interpretation" (p.
151). He hopes that through education,
[a]t least medical students can learn to appreciate that it may be
their magical hopes that cause them to intervene, rather than believing that they are responding to the magical expectations of their patients. Thus doctors' heroic attempts to try anything may not
necessarily be responsive to patients' needs but may turn out to be a
projection of their own needs onto patients (p. 151).14
This powerful insight is descriptive not only of the behavior of

human heart transplant pioneers, but also seems to have set the standard for the behavior of surgeons involved in artificial heart experimentation. In his autobiography, One Life,15 Christiaan Barnard has
a conversation with himself in which he tries to explain why he did not
have further discussions with Louis Washkansky about the risks and
likely outcomes of the first human-to-human heart transplant:
I offered a chance, and he grabbed it, without asking any questions.
At the South Pole, the wind can blow in one direction only - north. At
the point of death, any promise of help can go in one direction only toward hope. So I offered him hope, believing this was my duty. To

have refused it would be a betrayal of myself and my profession. In
16
a way, we share the same hope. We're in this together.

14.

(emphasis added).

15.

C.

16.

Id. at 293 (emphasis added).

BARNARD, ONE LIFE

(1969).
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This rationalization, of course, is consistent with Katz's notion
that Barnard had confused himself with his patient. It also is consistent with Dr. Afanasyevna's view that "doctors are entitled." It takes
this view even further, however, by arguing that doctors have a duty:
"to have refused it would be a betrayal of myself and my profession."
But it also indicates that Dr. Barnard believed that for Washkansky
there really is no choice; that since he was dying he must accept a heart
transplant. It was his only hope, and some hope is always better than
none. Later, Dr. Barnard refined the analogy, and the rationale for
action in the absence of full discussion, by arguing that for Washkansky the alternatives were so obvious that the choice was trivial:
For a dying man, it is not a difficult decision because he knows he is
at the end. If a lion chases you to the bank of a river filled with
crocodiles, you will leap into the water convinced you have a chance
to swim to the other side. But you would never accept such odds if
there were no lion.17
This "lion and the crocodiles" analogy has become the standard
by which artificial heart experimenters discuss the decisions of their
patient-subjects to this day. For example, when Dr. Denton Cooley
implanted the world's first total artificialheart into the chest of Haskell Karp, in 1969, he initially argued that his own skill and the patient's consent were the only justification needed:
I have done more heart surgery than anyone else in the world....
Based on this experience, I believe I am qualified to judge what is
right and proper for my patients. The permission I receive to do
what I do, I receivefrom my patients. It is not received from a government agency or from one of my seniors.18
17. Id. (emphasis added). Recently, Dr. Barnard has moved to the United States,
"discovered" Glycosphingolipids, a compound he believes rejuvenates the skin, and has
begun arguing that physicians should be legally granted "the right of active euthanasia ....
[Because] [t]here is no point in using medical technology to prolong a painful death or an
empty life." In discussing his own past heart transplant work he says individuals inevitably
and wrongly asked him "how long" his patients had survived. "They should have asked
whether surgery had improved the patient's life. If so, it was a success, even if he survived
only a few months. If not, it had failed, no matter how long he lived ..
" He argues that
"patients usually understand this better than the rest of us":
They are seldom obsessed with surviving at all costs, and they grow less so in
proportion to their illness. In contrast, it is the healthy who need to cling even to
the bitterest life.
Barnard, First Word, OMNI, Mar. 1986, at 6 (emphasis added). These words, of course,
have direct application to Dr. Barnard's conversations with both Washkansky and
Blaiberg. They also indicate how radically his own thinking about death has changed over
the past twenty years.
18. T. THOMPSON, HEARTS 216 (1971) (emphasis added).
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Later, however, he restated the issue of the patient's consent in
"lion and crocodile" terms: "He was a drowning man. A drowning
man can't be too particularwhat he's going to use as a possible life
preserver. It was a desperate thing, and he knew it."' 19
More recently we have witnessed the advent of "permanent" artificial hearts, and renewed interest in using artificial hearts on a temporary basis as a "bridge" (or "tollgate") to a human heart transplant.
The informed consent issues explicated by Katz remain relegated to
matters of secondary concern and unaddressed in any but crude and
primitive manners.
II.

PERMANENT ARTIFICIAL HEARTS AND INFORMED CONSENT

Prior to performing the world's firstpermanent artificial heart implant, Dr. William DeVries, like Dr. Cooley, underlined his view of
the importance of informed consent as the primary justification for
performing the procedure. One major problem was that the only
power source available was an approximately 400 pound drive cart,
which had to be attached to both a power source and a source of compressed air, that made ambulation almost impossible. Many, including one of the device's designers, Dr. Robert Jarvik, believed the
device shouldn't be used on humans until it was easily portable or
entirely implantable. Dr. DeVries disagreed:
Many people have asked us the question as to-it's not fully implantable, why then would you do it? Why don't you wait ten
years, when it's implantable, and then do it? But the key is informed
consent. Why should I letpeople die, when I can give them a chance
to live-if they're willing to accept the limitations of the external
20
pumping system?
19. J. THORWALD, THE PATIENTS 402 (1971) (emphasis added). The Karp implant
led to a lawsuit by his widow against Dr. Cooley primarily alleging lack of informed consent. Both the trial court and the appeals court summarily dismissed the notion that more
than the patient's consent was needed to justify this experiment. They concluded that the
implant was therapy for a dying man: "[T]he record contains no evidence that Mr. Karp's
treatment was other than therapeutic and we agree that in this context an action for experimentation must be measured by traditional evidentiary malpractice standards." Karp v.
Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'g Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.
Tex. 1972). This conclusion is untenable. Either the judge was not presented with sufficient evidence at trial about the nature of this first-of-its-kind human experiment, or the
judge viewed the risks involved as irrelevant. For a fuller discussion of this case, see G. J.
ANNAS, L. H. GLANTZ & B. F. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE SUBJECT'S DILEMMA 11-14 (1977).
20. Nova, Artificial Heart (Time-Life Video 1984) at 3 (transcript). The other major
problem was and remains the incompatibility of human blood and the device's surface that
leads to clotting.
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Dr. DeVries is certainly correct insofar as he asserts that the informed consent of his subject is a necessary prerequisite to acceptable
human experimentation: if the subject's competent, voluntary, informed and understanding consent cannot be obtained, the experiment
cannot be performed lawfully or ethically. 2 1 Even in this regard, however, it can be argued persuasively that although the consent form and
process used by Dr. DeVries in the Barney Clark case is a vast improvement over the consent process used by Dr. Christiaan Barnard,
and a considerable improvement over the consent form and process
used by Dr. Denton Cooley, it was still seriously deficient.
Specifically, Dr. Clark signed an eleven page consent form that is
more notable for its length than its content. It was incomplete, internally inconsistent, and confusing. It assumed, as his physicians then
believed, that Dr. Clark would either die on the table, or go home in
about ten days and continue to be mentally competent for the rest of
his life. It took no account at all of a "halfway success"; survival coupled with severe confusion, mental incompetence, or coma. The consent form made no provisions for proxy consent to additional
procedures or experiments in the event of incompetence, for a mechanism to terminate the experiment, or for how Dr. Clark would die.
These and other shortcomings are serious and evidence a lack of clear
22
thinking and planning on the part of Dr. DeVries and the Utah IRB.
But one can argue that it is easy to be critical of any initial attempt,
and that no local IRB could have done better. As Professor Al Jonsen
has put it, the Utah IRB, in devising a consent form and process with
Dr. DeVries, was asked "to build a Boeing 747 with Wright Brothers
parts."' 23 What about changes that have been made over the past four
years in the consent form and process?
Disturbingly, there have been very few changes, and most have
See G. J. ANNAS, L. H. GLANTZ & B. F. KATZ, supra note 19, at 27-61.
For a fuller discussion of this form, see Annas, Consent to the Artificial Heart:
The Lion and the Crododiles, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1983, at 20-22. For arguments that the form and process was reasonable, see AFTER BARNEY CLARK 22-24 (M.
Shaw ed. 1984) ("I believe that Barney Clark's consent was autonomous, voluntary, and
fully informed.") [hereinafter AFTER BARNEY CLARK]; Galetti, Replacement of the Heart
with a Mechanical Device: The Case of Dr. Barney Clark, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 312
21.
22.

(1984); Levine, Total Artificial Heart Implantation-EligibilityCriteria, 252 J. A.M.A.
1458 (1984) ("Considering the alternatives ...I think he made an easily understandable
choice ...."). For a discussion of Dr. Clark's psychiatric history before and during the
experiment, see Berenson & Grosser, Total Artificial Heart Implantation, 41 ARCH. GEN.
PSYCHIATRY

23.

910 (1984).

On the role of the IRB, see Eichwald, Woolley, Cole & Beamer, Insertion of the

Total Artificial Heart, IRB, Aug./Sept., 1981 at 6; Woolley, Ethical Issues in the Implantation of the TotalArtificial Heart, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 292 (1984).
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been for the worse. Since Dr. DeVries moved to Humana Audubon in
Louisville, Kentucky, to conduct his permanent artificial heart implants, he has done three more as of December, 1986. In May, 1985,
after completing all four of his implants, he discussed the issue of informed consent to the artificial heart with New York Times medical
writer, Dr. Lawrence K. Altman. Dr. Altman reports:
Dr. DeVries has repeatedly said that the four men in whom he has
implanted artificial hearts were so coerced by their diseases that
they felt that death was their only alternative. In signing the 17page consent form, each recipient, Dr. DeVries has said, "told me in
their own way that they didn't care" if they read it or not, and had
signed it primarily because they had to [in order] to get the device. 24
This is a devastating admission from a surgeon who uses informed consent as the primary justification for permanent artificial
heart implants in humans. Was it the patients or Dr. DeVries who
believed in every case that "death was their only alternative?" And
what would it take to persuade Dr. DeVries either that there were
other alternatives, or that death could be preferable to the "magic
machine?" 25 Professor Katz's concern with requiring conversation,
24. Altman, The Ordealof a "Human Experiment," N.Y. Times, May 14, 1985, at
C3, col. 2.
25. After performing his second implant, on William Schroeder, Dr. DeVries had
this to say on when he might consider calling a halt to the experiment: "[I]t's impractical
on the basis of two patients to determine whether or not these questions [whether society
can afford artificial heart implants] can be answered. The third patient may have a stroke,
the fourth patient may have a stroke, the fifth patient may have a stroke. In that case the
question is not going to be can society pay for it. The question will be: is it properto even
do this? Should it even be done anymore?" Q&A: Dr. William C DeVries, Louisville Courier J., Feb. 3, 1985, at 13, col. 2 (emphasis added).
And after the first four permanent artificial heart implants, the director of the Humana
Heart Institute was asked how Humana could argue that any progress was being made
given the severe problems suffered by the recipients. Dr. Lansing replied: "Yes, there is
progress. [William] Schroeder is improving and showing signs of recovery; [Murray]
Haydon will soon be off the respirator and beginning to make a recovery; and yes, [Jack]
Burcham has required dialysis for a pre-op condition, but we hope it is temporary. All the
patients are living, and at this time none of the three has a condition that is either irreversible
or immediately life-threatening." AM. MED. NEWS, May 10, 1985, at 58 (emphasis added).
This statement, made on April 24, 1985, unfortunately turned out to be wishful thinking.
Within hours, Mr. Burcham was dead. Also, prior to their deaths, Mr. Schroeder suffered
subsequent devastating strokes, and Mr. Haydon was not able to leave his intensive care
room for more than brief periods. The only other patient in the world to receive the Jarvik7 as a permanent implant, Leif Stenberg, suffered a stroke and died, and the Swedish surgeon who did the implant, Bjarne Semb, has said publicly that he will not do any more
implants because the device is simply too crude and causes such terrible effects in its recipients. Of Mr. Stenberg, Dr. Semb said, "[h]e might as well have died." Kolata, Surgeons
Disagree on Artificial Heart, 230 SCIENCE 786 (1985).
It is possible to make an argument that the initial implant in Barney Clark was justifi-
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and exploring what myths or beliefs the surgeons and their patients
are harboring that permit them to accept silence seems especially critical when dealing with the most highly publicized experiment in the
history of the world.
The primary rationale for accepting silence seems to be the same
one that comforted Drs. Barnard and Cooley: the patient was dying
and so had no choice. In Dr. DeVries' words concerning Dr. Barney
Clark: "He was too old for a transplant, there were no drugs that
'26
would help; the only thing that he could look forward to was dying."
These experiences raise the question as to whether we can ever
justify experimentation on very sick, terminally ill patients. Doesn't
their disease, Solzhenitsyn's story of Oleg notwithstanding, inevitably
coerce them into "volunteering" for something they necessarily will
see as hopeful? And won't parents inevitably volunteer their children
for even bizarre and unprecedented experiments, like xenografts, if
they are led to believe the experiment might prevent death? 27 Here
able in that it was not known "a priori" that it would cause such devastating results. It is
no longer possible reasonably to make this argument. Recipients have died and/or suffered
devastating problems. It would seem that there is simply not enough known about anticoagulation therapy to prevent either bleeding or strokes, for this device to be used in
humans at this time. More animal and laboratory research is required before human experimentation can ethically recommence.
It should also be emphasized that while the inventor and researcher may believe in the
Jarvik-7, almost no one else does. The NIH Working Group, for example, while endorsing
research on fully implantable electrical artificial hearts, noted that "pneumatically actuated
...systems that do not permit substantial levels of ambulation and relatively normal activity are importantlysuboptimal." WORKING GROUP ON MECHANICAL CIRCULATORY SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL HEART, LUNG, AND BLOOD INSTITUTE,

ARTIFICIAL HEART

33
(1985) (emphasis added).
26. Clark, An Incredible Affair of the Heart, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1982, at 71-72.
See also supra note 17.
27. Perhaps the example of the most "magical thinking" in recent history is provided
by Dr. Leonard Bailey and his transplant of a baboon's heart into a dying infant known as
"Baby Fae." Of course this infant herself could not consent to this first-of-its-kind human
experiment, and since one of the primary hypotheses being tested (the effectiveness of
cyclosporin on xenografts) could have been tested on an adult, I believe this experiment
should not have been tried first on a child who could not agree to it. The case was made
even worse because the infant's parents were separated, and the family impoverished. But
Dr. Bailey's belief in himself and his procedure is remarkable. Within ten days after the
transplant he said, "[iun the best scenario, Baby Fae will celebrate her 21st birthday without the need of further surgery. That possibility exists." Breo, Interview with "Baby Fae's"
Surgeon: TherapeuticIntent was Topmost, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 16, 1984, at 1.
In fact, this was never a realistic or reasonable expectation, and it raises serious questions both about Dr. Bailey's ability to separate science from emotion (or to distinguish
medicine from magic), and what exactly he led the parents of Baby Fae to expect. I have
said flatly that this transplant was an "inadequately reviewed, inappropriately consented to,
premature experiment on an impoverished, terminally ill newborn that cannot be justified";
AND ASSIST DEVICES:

DIRECTIONS, NEEDS, COSTS, SOCIETAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES
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Katz helps us again, by insisting on explicit recognition of the limits of
interventions at the end of life. Of course, we can justify experimentation on such individuals only if we can obtain their voluntary and informed consent.
But informed consent alone is an insufficient justification for radical human experimentation. Proper attention to the other nine
precepts of the Nuremberg Code, for example, would have required us
to address the question of whether there isn't an "a priori" reason to
believe that "death or disabling injury" will necessarily follow from
this experiment; whether such a "halfway success" of continued life in
a severely compromised state doesn't amount to "unnecessary physical
and mental suffering and injury"; and whether the "anticipated results" justify the performance of this experiment. The welfare of the
subject of this experiment does not seem to have been addressed adequately, and until it was, consent for the experiment should not have
been sought.
Dr. DeVries sometimes seemed to justify this experimental shortcoming by acting as if he believed he was engaged in therapy, not experimentation at all. At times, for example, he suggested that his goal
was to get his patient to go home, or to "play a round of golf." In fact,
this scenario never seems to have been realistic. Dr. Clark realized,
and that "therapy was never a realistic goal." Annas, Baby Fae: The "Anything Goes"

School of Human Experimentation, HASTINGS

CENTER REP.,

Feb. 1985, at 15-17. Others

have been somewhat kinder, but consistent with Katz's "magical thinking" hypothesis.
The experiment, for example, has been described as a "leap of faith." Dr. Jack Provonsha,
Director of Loma Linda's Center for Christian Bioethics, has even asserted that such "leaps
of faith" are more likely to occur at religious institutions like Loma Linda (predominately
Seventh Day Adventists): "The person who is part of a supportive, communal religion can
'become more secure' in the atmosphere, and then may be willing to take chances that a
less secure, less religiously committed individual is willing to take." Colen, Ethics and
Baby Fae, Newsday, Nov. 2, 1984, Part II, at 2, col. 1. This seems more "faith healing"
than science. Cf. Fox, It's the Same, but Different: A Sociological Perspective on the Case
of the Utah Artificial Heart, in AFTER BARNEY CLARK, supra note 22, at 68-90 (discussion
of the role for Mormonism in the Barney Clark case).
Medical-scientific commentators on Dr. Bailey's published paper on Baby Fae, Bailey,
Nehlsen-Cannarella, Concepcion & Jolley, Baboon-to-Human CardiacXenotransplantation
in a Neonate, 254 J. A.M.A. 3321 (1985), used words like "essentially irrelevant" to describe the tissue typing done on the baboon, and "wishful thinking" to describe the "belief
that the infant's immune system was immature and thus more readily immunosuppressed .. " Jonasson & Hardy, The Case of Baby Fae, 254 J. A.M.A. 3358, 3359 (1985).
Bailey later accused these authorities of "representing dated, historical thinking . ... "
Breo, Precise Cause of Death Eludes "Baby Fae" Team, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 20, 1985,
at 18. On the other hand, his immunologist, Dr. Nehlsen-Cannarella, admitted that with
"dying babies ... it's difficult to separate strong desires and wishes from scientific truth
....
Id. at 16. See also Caplan, Ethical Issues Raised by Research Involving Xenografts,
254 J. A.M.A. 3339 (1985).
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shortly before his death, that although he also had hoped for some
therapeutic gain, he had become involved in "pure non-therapeutic experimentation" for others. Asked by Dr. DeVries in his only publicly
shown videotaped interview if the experience had been hard, Dr. Clark
replied, "[y]es, it's been hard, but the heart itself has pumped right all
along and I think it's doing well."' 28 Clark, it seems, fully realized
what DeVries could not admit openly: the subject, who at the outset
was a patient seen as an end with the artificial heart used as a means to
sustain him, had become simply a means to the end of sustaining the
artificial heart. Dr. Clark nonetheless might have agreed to this experiment in advance even if he had known that he would spend most of
his 112 remaining days on earth in an intensive care unit, extremely
debilitated and depressed, and mentally incompetent at most times.
But if this had been known, the IRB should not have approved the
experiment since it would have violated most of the basic precepts of
subject protection set forth in the Nuremberg Code.
Consent, even informed consent, cannot convert an otherwise unacceptable experiment into an acceptable one. Before patients are
asked to consent to experimental procedures, the procedure itself must
be judged independently to be a reasonable one to perform on a human
being. Using informed consent in a vacuum without such independent
review, makes desperate, dying patients targets for quackery, because
an offer of "life" from a physician (whom patients are likely to mistake
and misidentify as Christ or God) is an offer dying patients are in no
reasonable position to refuse. Use of informed consent in this context
converts it from a shield designed to protect the patient into a sword
designed to attack the patient's vulnerability. There is an element of
paternalism in this suggestion, of course, but no more than that involved in licensing physicians, including these experimenters, and regulating prescription drugs. But we are unlikely to succeed at
protecting subject welfare unless we provide terminally ill patients
with more procedural protections than we provide healthy volunteers.
Much more imaginative work needs to be done on informed consent to
permanent implants (and more experimentation with animal models
as well) before additional implants can be justified. IRBs have been
unable to contribute much to protecting patients in this setting, and
although their prior review is legally and ethically required, it has been
superficial to date and remains insufficient to protect potential subjects
28. Altman, Recipient of Artificial Heart Calls the Ordeal Worthwhile, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 3, 1983, at Al, col. 2 (emphasis added).
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29. See Williams, Why IRB's Falterin Reviewing Risks and Benefits, IRB, May/June
1984, at 1-5. On December 20, 1985 the FDA held a hearing to determine if Dr. DeVries
should be permitted to complete his "series of seven" permanent implants that had originally been approved, or whether such research should be suspended in view of the devastating effects it had had on the first four recipients. The FDA decided to permit Dr. DeVries
to continue, but only if additional information was supplied to the FDA, and future implants were reviewed on a case-by-case basis. See Clark, Stiffer Rules for the Heart, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 30, 1985, at 68; Boffey, More Implants of Artificial Hearts Are Urged by US.
Health Panel, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1985, at 34, col. 1. No major problems were seen by
the agency in the consent form or process, although Dr. DeVries reported to a U.S. Congressional committee on February 5, 1986, that modifications were planned for both.
Following a three day visit to Dr. DeVries in August, 1985, I suggested further exploration of a number of problem areas in informed consent:
[L]et me outline some of the major areas of concern I have about the protocol
review and consent process, and suggestions that might help to improve it in the
event further implants are done.
1. Correspondence between the protocol and the consentform
As we discussed, a review of the protocol indicates that the lack of correspondence between the studies you are conducting and those actually consented to is
substantial and serious and should be corrected. Specifically: (a) The assertion
in the protocol that the primary goal is therapy cannot stand scrutiny, the protocol itself needs to be amended to place experimental goals first, and therapeutic
goals (if any) in a clearly secondary position. (b) As to the experimental studies,
none of the ones that are so clearly described in the protocol are detailed at all in
the consent form, and this is, of course, the primary purpose of the consent form,
i.e., to spell out what experimental things will be done, including their risks to the
patient. Specifically, you need to at least describe the non-invasive studies (e.g.,
circulatory response studies; nutritional studies; and exercise studies); and to both
describe in detail, and list the risks of the invasive studies (e.g., the hemodynamics
studies; the pharmacological studies, including Isoproterenol, Dopamine, Sodium
Nitroprusside, Nitroglycerin, and, unless it has been deleted, Ephedrine; and the
studies with the Heimes driver). Since many of these studies are designed to take
place at three different times (at the time of the implant; one week after the implant; and 6-8 weeks after the implant), each occasion should have a separate
consent form (the original master consent form should describe those studies that
will be done at the time of the implant, and indicate what followup studies are
planned and that a separate consent form and process will be employed for the
followup studies).
2. Defining the role of the Subject's "Advocate" and that of the IRB "monitor"
The role of each of these separate individuals is unclear and needs clarification if
they are to contribute to making the consent process a meaningful one for the
subject and his family.
3. The Role of the IRB
My own impression is that the Humana IRB has done both you and your subjects
a disservice by permitting use of the current consent form (for the reasons outlined both above, and infra), and by failing to either understand or support the
basic functions of an IRB. Specifically, the three members of the IRB I met with
argued vigorously for such propositions as: (1) the implant procedure was not
experimental at all, but "the whole thing is primarily therapeutic" and we should
treat these research subjects "like any other patient;" (2) informed consent is
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ARTIFICIAL HEARTS FOR "TEMPORARY" USE

Dr. Denton Cooley implanted the world's first two mechanical
"just a parade of horribles" to the patient and so serves only to scare them; and
(3) withdrawal from the experiment by the research subject would be "murder" if
the researcher permitted it and turned off the artificial heart .... If the Humana
IRB actually believes the propositions these possibly non-representative members
put to me on August 27, 1985, it should come as no surprise to anyone that they
found their task so simple that they were able to adopt the Utah form almost
verbatim, changing primarily only the identity of the hospital in the submitted

consent form.
4. The Publicity Clause
As I discussed with you, members of the IRB, and your attorneys, this clause is
unprecedented and unacceptable. Subjects have never before in the history of
human experimentation had to sign away all rights to privacy regarding every
possible mode of communication, and should not have to in their case. It should
be separated from the "master form" and rewritten in a manner which more
closely mirrors a reasonable attempt to protect privacy. [Humana's publicity
clause provides: "I am fully aware of the considerable public interest anticipated
in my story as a recipient of a Total Artificial Heart. I am also aware that
Humana Hospital Audubon has an obligation to disseminate medical information
concerning my hospital course as deemed appropriate in the judgment of my physician. In addition to those materials identified in paragraph 13 [regarding medical professionals and the FDA] Humana Hospital Audubon, as approved by my
physician, is authorized to make, or permit to be made, photographs, slides, films,
video tapes, recordings and other means of recording and/or communicating
hereinafter referred to as "material(s)," that may be used in newspapers, magazine articles, television, radio broadcasts, movies or any other media or means of
dissemination. I consent to the use of my name, likeness, or voice for such purposes. I agree that Humana Hospital-Audubon or Humana, Inc. will be the sole
and exclusive owner of such materials, and I release the Humana Heart Institute,
International, Humana, Inc., Humana Hospital Audubon, their officers, agents
and employees from all claims of liability with respect to the showing, use or
dissemination of such material(s). I understand that the materials which are
made public, as described in this paragraph, will protect my modesty and be
within generally accepted bounds of good taste.]
5. Deletion of the Right to Withdraw Clause
(a) This is, as we discussed at length, a profound.and serious omission, since it
seems to indicate that all involved have adopted the view of the IRB Chairman
that terminating the experiment by turning off the artificial heart, even at the
express demand of the patient, is a crime of some sort, perhaps murder. This
conclusion indicates that very little thought has gone into this. I can understand
the reasons for not overly-dramatizing this issue with the promise of a "key" to
turn off the driver; but to swing entirely the other way and imply that under no
circumstances can the patient or his doctor turn off or disconnect the artificial
heart is to transform the subject entirely into a means of preserving the "life" of
the artificial heart, instead of a willing volunteer in an experiment that concludes
when he decides he has had enough. If this really is what is intended, at the very
least subjects should be informed in advance that the artificial heart will be kept
in place and running as long as possible no matter what the patient, his family
and doctor wants, and no matter what his physical condition. Even if the artificial heart was therapeutic (which I think we agree it is not) a patient would still
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have the right to order its use disconnected, as patients can now discontinue kidney dialysis or mechanical ventilator support, or even artificial feeding, although
all are necessary to maintain their lives. When the artificial heart becomes totally
implantable and reliable enough to be therapeutic, we may have debating issues
here; but at the current time arguments that turning off the Utah drive with the
patient's consent is "murder" is simply uniformed hysteria, that has the result of
making the patient a servant of the artificial heart itself. (b) Related to this is
the problem of what to do if the patient is incompetent to make a decision. This
eventuality should be planned for in advance (since it is very predictable) and the
prospective subject asked to (1) spell out as best he can the circumstances under
which he wants the heart turned off if he cannot communicate; and (2) designate
a proxy with the authority to make the decision for him under the criteria he
outlines.
6. The Consent Process
We all believe that consent is a process, not a form, and that the form is merely
evidence that the process actually took place . . . I think it would be useful to
devise a question or two to ask the subject regarding every major point made in
the consent form. The question should not, of course, be one that can simply be
answered "yes" even if "yes" does not reflect the patient's actual understanding,
e.g., "Do you understand all of the risks?" Instead, the question should demand
use of specific information about the experiment that you believe it is critical that
they understand in order to give their "informed consent" to it. (e.g., Can you
describe the types of studies I am going to perform on you and the artificial heart
shortly after it is implanted?; What happened to the last five individuals who had
permanent artificial hearts implanted in them?, etc.). If the subject cannot adequately answer the questions, he is incapable of giving informed consent, and
cannot be accepted as a suitable candidate until the information needed to answer
the questions is mastered. Such a procedure may help both the researcher and the
subject to take the informed consent process more seriously.
Realistic answers probably will not be found in simply trying to apply rules
and regulations developed primarily for routine drug studies. What is involved in
the artificial heart experiment is nothing short of transforming a life, and with it
all previous interrelationships with the environment and with one's family. Indeed, your experiments will probably teach as much about these transformations
and interactions than about the interaction of the artificial heart with the human
body. Accordingly, what is needed is much more relevant (as opposed to simply
more detailed) information about the impact of the artificial heart on one's lifestyle, mobility, psychology, and relationships to one's family. Indeed, if as now
appears to be the case, the artificial heart utterly transforms not only the patient,
but also the patient's family (at least the entire life of the patient's spouse) a good
deal more attention needs to be given to this aspect of the experiment. Much, if
not all, of this information should be supplied to prospective subjects before they
even come to Louisville to be formally screened for the program. Consent forms
themselves are clearly inadequate. What is needed is a book-length treatment on
the program and the experiences of the first subjects, together with appropriate
illustrations. This could probably be usefully supplemented by videotapes of past
and current recipients, as well as telephone conversations with their family members. These should be mastered before a potential recipient is on site since the trip
to Louisville itself represents a decision to seek the artificial heart and individuals
are likely to arrive at Louisville with misperceptions of what is likely to occur if
the artificial heart is implanted in them. It is, of course, much harder to dispel
misperceptions that have been acted on than it is to present information to an
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hearts for temporary use in 1969 and 1981.30 After these two implants, Dr. DeVries performed four permanent implants and Dr.
Bjarne Semb performed one in Sweden. After these seven implants,
"temporary" mechanical implants, used to sustain the patient until a
human heart for transplant becomes available, have dominated the
field. This use is controversial for many reasons, not the least of which
is that as long as there is a shortage of human hearts for transplant,
temporary artificial hearts are unlikely to save any net lives; they will
only change the identity of those who actually obtain the human
hearts. 3' Moreover, the way these devices change the recipient's identity is an inherently unfair one, by permitting those with artificial
hearts to "jump the queue" and become first in line for the next avail32
able matching human heart.

But my quarry here is informed consent. Initially, note that temporary artificial hearts always have the possibility of becoming defacto
permanent (e.g., if the patient suffers a complication, such as a stroke,
that makes him or her ineligible for a human heart transplant). Since
this risk is real, 33 we should require informed consent procedures to be
at least as rigorous as those for permanent implantation.
But the historical record to date is one of almost indifference to
informed consent. This highly experimental intervention has been justified consistently primarily on the basis that it is a therapeutic modality in an emergency setting. The third use of such a temporary device
(after Dr. Denton Cooley's two) was perhaps the most clumsy and
uncommitted individual. Accordingly, as I think your own experience to date
illustrates, by the time the subject is actually given the consent form to read (or
reads it himself) it is too late for them to care about the consents or to "change
their minds" and turn back from the course they seem to have inevitably embarked on ....
Letter from George J. Annas to Dr. William DeVries (Sept. 26, 1985).
30. Cooley, Liotta & Hallman, Orthotopic CardiacProsthesisforTwo-staged Cardiac
Replacement, 24 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 723 (1969); Cooley, Staged Cardiac Transplantation:

Report of Three Cases, I HEART TRANSPLANTION 145 (1982).
31. Annas, No Cheers for Temporary Artificial Hearts, HASTINGS

CENTER REP.,

Oct., 1985, at 27-28 [hereinafter No Cheersfor Temporary Artificial Hearts]. Contra, Hill,
Farrar, Hershon, Compton, Avery, Levin & Brent, Use of a Prosthetic Ventricle as a Bridge
to Cardiac Transplantation for Postinfarction Cardiogenic Shock, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED.
626 (1986).
32. See No Cheers for Temporary Artificial Hearts, supra note 3 1. See also, Annas,
The Prostitute, the Playboy, and the Poet: Rationing Schemesfor Organ Transplantation, 75
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 187 (1985).
33. For example see the cases of Mary Lund, who waited more than 40 days on a
"temporary" artificial heart before obtaining a human heart replacement; and Bernadette
Chayrez, who has received two "temporary" artificial hearts and lived on her second one
for more than 200 days before dying during her second human heart transplant. See infra
notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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embarrassing since it involved a device that was not even designed or
approved for use in human beings. 34 I describe the case in some detail
because it has set the tone for a rash of "me-too" experiments similar
to those that followed Christiaan Barnard's first human-to-human
heart transplant, 35 and has directly caused the FDA to take a laissez
faire attitude toward "temporary" implants that seems to be an abdication of the agency's responsibility to protect the public from unproven and untested medical devices.
IV.

THE CASE OF THE PHOENIX HEART

On Tuesday morning, March 5, 1985, Dr. Jack Copeland, Chief
of University Medical Center's Heart Transplant Team in Tucson, Arizona, performed a human heart transplant on Thomas Creighton, a
thirty-three year old, divorced father of two. The procedure was not a
success, as Mr. Creighton's body rejected the heart. At 3:00 a.m.
Wednesday morning a search for another human heart began, and Dr.
Copeland placed Mr. Creighton on a heart-lung machine. At 5:30
a.m. the medical team placed a call to Dr. Cecil Vaughn of Phoenix,
asking if he had an artificial heart ready for human use. Dr. Vaughn
was scheduled to implant an experimental model developed by dentist
Kevin Cheng into a calf later that day, and had never considered use
of the device in a human. Nonetheless, he called Dr. Cheng. Dr.
Cheng told him, "It's designed for a calf and not ready for a human
yet." Asked to think about it for ten minutes, Dr. Cheng recalls, "I
knelt and prayed." When Vaughn called him back he said, "The
pump is sterile, ready to go."' 3 6 The two helicoptered from the hospital to the airport, chartered a jet to Tucson, and then took another
helicopter to the Tucson hospital. They arrived at 9:30 a.m. Wednesday morning. The implant procedure began at noon. Designed for a
34.

For a detailed description of the case of Thomas Creighton, see Annas, The

Phoenix Heart: What We Have to Lose,

HASTINGS CENTER REP.,

June 1985, at 15-16

[hereinafter The Phoenix Heart]; Copeland, Levinson, Smith, Icenogle, Vaughn, Cheng, Ott
& Emery, The Total Artificial Heartas a Bridge to Transplantation:A Report of Two Cases,
256 J. A.M.A. 2991 (1986).
35. Following Dr. Barnard's initial human-to-human heart transplant, about 150
human heart transplants were done at 60 places around the world in the next two years.
There were almost no long-term survivors in the unseemly rush to join the "me-too" club
of heart transplant surgeons, and this episode stands as one of the blackest marks in the

history of surgery. B. JENNETT, HIGH TECHNOLOGY MEDICINE 84-85 (1984).
36. Altman, Anguish, Hope, a Moment of Fame: A Heart's Story is Told, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 19, 1985, at C1-2, col. 1; See also, Blakeslee, Arizona Surgeon Defends Heart
Implant, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1985, at C2, col. 1;Hubert & Ring, Tucsonian Gets
Mechanical Heart at UMC.New Device Doesn't Have FDA Sanction, Arizona Daily Star,
Mar. 7, 1985, at 2, col. 1.
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calf, it was too large, and surgeons could not close the chest around
the device. The implant maintained circulation until 11:00 p.m. that
night when, in preparation for a second heart transplant, doctors
turned it off and put Mr. Creighton back on the heart-lung machine.
By 3:00 a.m. Thursday, Dr. Copeland completed a second human
heart transplant. The next day Mr. Creighton died.
The press treated the story like a modem American melodrama.
USA Today called the implantation of Dr. Chen's heart "the fulfillment of an American dream."' 37 The New York Times editorialized
that "the artificial heart has at last proved it has a useful role .... ,,38
Time headlined the event as a "bold gamble"; 3 9 and Newsweek faulted
the FDA, noting, "[i]t's hardly fair to doctors, or their patients, to
make them break the law to save a life."' 40 The FDA initially termed
the unauthorized experiment a violation of the law, but by week's end
had done an about face and was flailing itself as "part of the
4
problem." 1
Dr. Copeland relied upon the same two basic excuses his predecessors had used to justify the implant in the absence of the patient's
consent: (1) the "only other option was just to let him die" so "we had
nothing to lose"; and (2) in an emergency, a physician can do anything
to save the patient's life. 42 Neither of these assertions can stand scru-

tiny. The physician may have "nothing to lose," but the patient certainly does. The choice is not, as the five permanent implant patients
have all demonstrated, simply one between "life and death." The
much more likely scenario is life in a severely disabled and debilitated
state; a risk to which only the patient himself or herself should be able
to consent. The rationale that for a dying patient anything is justified,
is an illustration of what Professor Katz has termed the "magical
thinking"; that the doctor actually has the power to conquer death,
and that prolonged life (or prolonging the dying process) is always a
37. Kuhn & Pesce, Heartmaker: A Dentist with a Dream, USA Today, Mar. 8, 1985,
at 1A,col. 3.
38. The Man with the Illegal Heart, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1985, at A22, col. 1. Even
after having the benefit of another nine months to rethink the issue, and after concluding
that the permanent artificial heart "in its present form ... cannot be described as a success"; the Times continued to describe temporary implants as "useful." Editorial, The
Heart that Fizzled, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1986 at A26, col. 1.
39. Wallis, A Bold Gamble in Tucson, TIME, Mar. 18, 1985, at 63.
40. Adler, When Life is on the Line, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18, 1985, at 88.
41. Altman, Learning to Live with the Artificial Heart, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1985,
§ 4, at 7, col. 3.
42. Hubert & Rothenberg, Patient has a 'long shot,' Arizona Daily Star, Mar. 8,
1985, at 3, col. 2.
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reasonable medical goal.4 3
Likewise, the emergency argument is misplaced. All heart-diseased patients will encounter such an "emergency" before they die,
and to use this as an excuse to experiment dehumanizes them, making
them "fair game" for any experiment no matter how bizarre or extreme. This, of course, is not the law. "Emergencies" like this are
anticipatable" and must be planned for, with the patient's consent, if
risky and extreme experimental interventions are to be offered. 4 5
The FDA collapsed when Dr. Copeland asserted he was only trying to "save a life" and did not notify the agency of his plans because
he did "not want to make the government his [Mr. Creighton's] executioner."' 46 Professor Katz would probably see this assertion as another
example of identity confusion on the part of the surgeon: Dr. Copeland seems to be projecting the role of "executioner" upon himself,
and took objectively useless steps to try to prevent the death of his
patient which he had (albeit in an attempt to save him), directly
caused by his own interventions. Conversation with the patient might
clarify this confusion, but more than conversation is required to prevent a recurrence of such well-intentioned but pointless
"experimentation."
Instead of attempting to curtail and contain experimental temporary use, the FDA actually took steps that served to encourage and
spread it, and did so in a way that almost guarantees that nothing
scientifically useful will be learned from temporary implants. In October, 1985, the FDA released proposed guidelines that permit any sur43. Nor is it appropriate to permit physicians even to offer certain interventions to
patients on the sole justification that the patients are "dying anyway." Taken to its logical
extreme, this rationale can justify any intervention. This, of course, undercuts the entire
rationale for an FDA or any other rules or regulations about human experimentation. Nor
is it the law. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in upholding the FDA's authority to forbid
the use of Laetrile, even on terminally ill cancer patients: "the terminally ill deserve protection ...from the vast range of self-styled panaceas that inventive minds can devise." U.S.
v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
44. Mr. Creighton was actually Dr. Copeland's third patient to experience immediate rejection of a heart transplant. Since rejection is a "reasonable foreseeable risk," it
should be planned for, not treated as an ad hoc "emergency." See The Phoenix Heart,
supra note 34.
45. The use of proxy consent to "emergency" experimentation, when allowed at all,
is generally permitted only for alternative therapies that pose little or no additional risk to
the subject, and even then only after a careful research protocol has been developed and
independently approved by an institutional review board. See, e.g., Brain Resuscitation
Clinical Trial I Study Group, Randomized ClinicalStudy of Thiopental Loading in Comatose Survivors of Cardiac Arrest, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 397 (1986).
46. Copeland, We Can't Sacrifice Lives to Risks, USA Today, Mar. 11, 1985, at 10A,
col. 2.
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geon to use any artificial heart in an "emergency" like the one just
described. 4 7 By February, 1986, the FDA had also given four centers
approval to do ten such implants each and by the end of 1986, surgeons had performed at least fifteen additional "temporary" implants. 4 There was no master protocol, no uniform patient selection
criteria, and, as the reader should be able to guess by now, we have
seen no advancements in the area of informed consent.
Indeed, the informed consent forms and processes devised by the
first four centers to use the artificial heart as a planned temporary
measure are all different and all significantly inadequate, suffering
from all or almost all of the shortcomings involved in obtaining consent for permanent use. It seems likely that the reason doctors have
not taken consent seriously at all in the "temporary" setting is because
the primary argument given for use of the temporary artificial heart is
its alleged "emergency" nature. In fact, in at least two of the first five
such implants, the patients themselves did not personally participate
in any meaningful way in the consent process. 49 And in Europe's first
"temporary" use, doctors did not even tell the patient of the planned
procedure "because we wanted to prevent him from being disturbed."5 0 This is unacceptable. The medical community should
never view a patient who does not personally consent to its implantation as an appropriate subject for experimentation with the artificial
heart since this is a profoundly radical experiment that can have predictable, devastating effects on the subject.
47. FDA, HHS, "Guidance for Emergency Use of Unapproved Medical Devices;
Availability," 50 Fed. Reg. 42,866 (1985).
48. The original four hospitals to obtain FDA approval are: U. of Arizona at Tucson; Pennsylvania State U. at Hershey; Abbott-Northwestern Hospital, Minneapolis; and
Presbyterian-University Hospital, Pittsburgh. The FDA (remarkably) has indicated it may
approve up to ten or eleven more sites. Cole, Four Years of Replacing Ailing Hearts." Surgeons Assess Data, Questions Remain, 256 J. A.M.A. 2921, 2930 (1986).
49. Thomas Creighton at Tucson, and Mary Lund in Minneapolis. Michael Drummond's consent is also of questionable quality. See The Phoenix Heart, supra note 34.
50. The implant was done at the West Berlin Charlottenburg University Clinic by
Dr. Emil Buecherl. German Not Informed He Has Artificial Heart, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10,
1986, at A17, col. 4. The case is reminiscent of another one collected by Professor Katz in

his casebook,

EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS,

supra note 7, which concerned a

twenty-three year old Brazilian cowboy who was the recipient of the first human-to-human
heart transplant in South America. He was not told about the proposed transplant, and
learned of it only when he heard a news broadcast about it in his hospital room a week
later. He lived about three weeks: "[T]he Brazilian surgeons point out at the same time
that no ethical questions are raised by da Cunha's [the patient] lack of informed consent. If
a man is incapable of understanding an operation he vitally needs, they say, there is no
choice but to proceed ....
Besides, add the surgeons, da Cunha was psychologically better
off not knowing and worrying about his risks." MED. WORLD NEWS, July 12, 1968, at 9-

10, quoted in

EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS,

supra note 7, 1098.
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Indeed, Dr. Copeland's third "bridge" patient (his second was a
spectacular success), 51 endured perhaps the most brutal course of any
of the permanent or temporary recipients to date, and it is impossible
to argue reasonably that her personal consent should not have been
required for each step of her experimental course. Mrs. Bernadette
Chayrez became the second woman in the world to receive an artificial
heart on February 3, 1986. Four days later Dr. Copeland removed it,
and replaced it with a human heart. The transplant was unsuccessful.
Subsequently, without the patient's consent, but with that of her family, she became the first person to receive a second artificial heart on
February 9. The implant turned out to be permanent, and Mrs.
Chayrez spent the rest of her life, 212 days, in the hospital on her
"temporary" artificial heart. She died on October 11, 1986, shortly
52
after an attempt to transplant another human heart into her body.
In commenting on the experience, Dr. Copeland has been unable
to recognize the ethical issues, or properly separate his own identity
from that of his patient. He has said, for example, "It was almost like
we were married to her, we all felt so close to her after all these
months."' 53 In this spousal role, he could not envision terminating the
experiment even when it was a clear failure. In his words, "[i]f you
cannot transplant a patient, the only option is to maintain them the
best you can on a total artificial heart."'54 He could not face the patient's death, and suggests that perhaps "a committee of bioethicists
and critics who want to save a few bucks could turn the pump off...
let them turn the damned thing off."' 55 The "damned thing" Dr.

Copeland was referring to was, of course, the artificial heart; but he
may just as well have been describing his patient. As for ethical
problems, Dr. Copeland is clear, "I don't see any ethical problems at
all in what happened with Bernadette ...

I see the work that we are

doing here in the same light as... sending up the spacecraft into outer
space. Now what possible benefit can we derive from that? A tremen'56
dous benefit. Our endeavors are the same."

With such a fantasyland view of one's activities, it should probably not be surprising that informed consent is a relatively trivial matter to the heart implanters. They should, however, recall that even at
51. See supra note 34.
52. Hubert, Chayrez Dies, Arizona Daily Star, Oct. 12, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
53. Epstein, HeartPatient'sDeath: Sorrow, Lessons Endure, AM. MED. NEWs, Nov.
7, 1986, at 3.
54. Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id. (emphasis added).
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the height of our competition with the Soviet Union to put the first
man on the moon, the United States rejected a proposal to send a
manned flight before we could insure its safe return. Even though volunteers could be obtained, it was thought to be a priori wrong to send
a man to his death even for something clearly seen as in the national
interest. Informed consent was simply an inadequate justification for
the taking of a human life. It is also an inadequate justification for
artificial heart experimentation.
Even if it were sufficient, however, we are not taking it seriously
at all in the temporary setting. And informed consent must be taken
seriously, at least seriously enough to establish uniform minimal standards that all American centers using "temporary" artificial hearts
must meet regarding informed consent. Of course, these should be
developed in conjunction with a uniform master protocol and patient
selection criteria, so that some useful scientific information can be obtained from multicenter use.5 7 The consent forms and processes from
the four primary American centers currently doing temporary implants demonstrate major variations on significant issues that should
58
be clarified and agreed upon before further implants are permitted.
57. See also Relman, Artificial Hearts-Permanentand Temporary, 314 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 644 (1986).
58. Three of the four centers used the Jarvik-7 (a smaller model was used for Mary
Lund at Abbott-Northwestern, where she became the first woman recipient), and at Hershey a substantially similar device, called the "Penn. State Heart," was used. The specific
areas of disagreement or significant divergence in the consent forms include:
1. The description of the nature of the experiment as contrasted with the artificial heart's
past use. One consent form, for example, describes it as having been "successfully implanted in five patients"; one says it "has supported life in growing calves for up to 260
days"; another that it has been subject to "extensive testing in experimental laboratory
animals and humans"; and the fourth is silent on its past uses and results.
2. The description of the risk/benefit ratio. None mention two of the complications that
all four of Dr. DeVries' patients have suffered: hemolytic anemia and immunosuppression;
and only one mentions pulmonary insufficiency as a possible complication. One form says
that all reasonable alternatives have been discussed, the other three allege that use of the
artificial heart is the "only alternative" available to maintain life. But even among these
three there are variations; one hedges with the phrase that it is "quite unlikely" that I will
survive long enough to obtain a heart transplant without it, while another asserts there isn't
"any possibility" of survival without use of the device.
3. The ability to withdraw. One form doesn't mention this issue at all; two others use
boilerplate language common to most consent forms involving drug studies, and one uses
somewhat reasonable language on the right to withdraw, "recognizing that such a decision
after the total artificial heart is implanted will result in my death."
4. Proxy consent. None of the forms provide any mechanism for proxy consent; and one
actually attempts to do away with the consent requirement altogether by providing: "If I
am too sick to be consulted, I authorize such procedures as are in the professionaljudgment
of the medical staff necessary and desirable for my life, safety or comfort." (emphasis
added).
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DEATH AND THE MAGIC MACHINE
CONCLUSION

Artificial hearts did not create all the problems they have exposed
in our informed consent procedures and IRB review. Nonetheless,
these problems are real, and the advent of the artificial heart provides
us with an opportunity to take meaningful action. This action should
not only protect the rights and welfare of potential recipients of the
artificial heart, but also should help set high standards for other controversial human experiments and develop fair and equitable allocation schemes for human organs. Work on informed consent is
necessary, but not alone sufficient to permit artificial heart
experimentation.
Because the issues of patient consent and quality medical research
in the area of the artificial heart have not received sufficient attention
and concern to adequately protect subjects of these experiments, there
should be a moratorium on further artificial heart research with
humans. This moratorium should continue until a joint review and
oversight committee of the FDA and NIH 59 has developed and ap5. Waivers. Two forms have no waivers and three guarantee that confidentiality will be
respected. One form, however, adopts the unacceptable publicity language of the Humana
form (see supra note 25) (Abbott-Northwestern), and another uses boilerplate products liability waiver language: "I expressly understand that no warranties are made with respect
to the implant and use of the temporary artificial heart, and all express or implied warranties are disclaimed, including without limitation any warranty of merchantability or warranty of fitness for a particular purpose."
6. If a human heart transplantis not done. Only one form discusses what will be done in
this case, and says simply, "you will be supported by the artificial heart as long as possible."
All of these issues, as well as the issue of payment for the device and the procedure, are
important enough and common enough to be dealt with in a uniform manner. It now
seems apparent that neither the manufacturer nor the hospitals will voluntarily form a
multicenter review panel to develop uniform standards related to the protocol, uniform
patient selection criteria, and minimal standards for informed consent forms and processes.
59. I presented a proposal to this effect to the Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives on
February 5, 1986, Status of the Artificial Heart Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 144-277 (1986) (testimony of Annas, G. J.). The two committee members present
were not supportive, nor was the FDA. The hearing itself took place one week after the
explosion of the space shuttle Challenger, and this disaster was commented on by almost all
of the witnesses. Their point was that we should not let the disaster stop the space program. Of course no one had suggested that it should, any more than anyone would seriously suggest the disasters suffered by Barney Clark, William Schroeder, Murray Hayden,
and Jack Burcham should end the quest for an effective, efficient and totally-implantable
artificial heart. But just as reality has caught up with the private hope and public hype of
the space program, so it has caught up with the hype of the artificial heart. Our reactions
to disappointment should be basically the same in both programs. To reassess, move forward with more knowledge and more caution, "to liberate the space program, [artificial
hearts] and technology in general from the mystique that we have placed on it ....
Our
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proved the scientific reasonableness, proper use, clear patient selection
criteria, adequate informed consent procedures, and clear rules on
stopping individual experiments. Permanent artificial heart implants
should be suspended at least temporarily because of the devastating
results they have had on subjects and their families, because their original justifications are no longer valid, and because the consent process
used is too primitive to protect human subjects. Temporary artificial
heart implants should be suspended for the same reasons, and additionally because there are no multicenter protocols, and the United
States has yet to develop a fair and equitable method for allocating
scarce human hearts.
Human experimentation is a public enterprise, and the use to
which humans are put, as well as the mandatory minimum procedures
used to protect their rights and welfare, are matters of serious public
concern. As illustrated by the most public experiments in the history
of the world, these issues are taking a back seat to the hype and glitz of
what currently passes for "scientific medicine." It is imperative that
we reassert the importance of human values implicit in the Nuremberg
Code before the Code is quietly rewritten by well-meaning inventors
and researchers.
I hope Professor Katz will find the following thoughts of another
patient in the Cancer Ward a fitting conclusion to a discussion of
"death-defying" magical heart implants and informed consent.
Of course he knew that since all people are mortal, some day he too
would have to turn in his check. But some day, not now! It was not
frightening to die right now. Why? Because: How would it be?
Afterwards, what? And how would it be not to exist, how would it
be without me?... [Hie could not even think about it, he could not
60

decide or say anything.

technology is imperfect, because we are imperfect, so either worshipping or despising our
technological age is just a neat shifting of blame." Walter McDougal (quoted by Wilford,
After the Challenger.- America's Future in Space, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1986, (Magazine) at
38, 106).
60. A. I. SOLZHENITSYN, supra note 2, at 301 (emphasis in original).
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